green numbers give full details | back to texts | unexpand these ideas
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category |
Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories. | |||
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5) | |||
A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress). |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause |
Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia]. | |||
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09) | |||
A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind. |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock |
Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock. | |||
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro) | |||
A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile. |