Ideas from 'Laughter' by Roger Scruton [1982], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Aesthetic Understanding' by Scruton,Roger [Methuen 1983,0-416-36160-9]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
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12170
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Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity
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Full Idea:
There are three common accounts of amusement: superiority theories (Hobbes's 'sudden glory'), 'relief from restraint' (Freud on jokes), and 'incongruity' theories (Schopenhauer).
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From:
Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §5)
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A reaction:
All three contain some truth. But one need not feel superior to laugh, and one may already be in a state of unrestraint. Schopenhauer seems closest to a good general account.
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12173
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The central object of amusement is the human
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Full Idea:
There are amusing buildings, but not amusing rocks and cliffs. If I were to propose a candidate for the formal object of amusement, then the human would be my choice, ...or at least emphasise its centrality.
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From:
Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §9)
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A reaction:
Sounds good. Animal behaviour only seems to amuse if it evokes something human. Plants would have to look a bit human to be funny.
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12169
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Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason
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Full Idea:
Man is the only animal that laughs, so a starting point for all enquiries into laughter must be the hypothesis that it is an attribute of reason (though that gets us no further than our definition of reason).
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From:
Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §1)
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A reaction:
I would be inclined to say that both our capacity for reason and our capacity for laughter (and, indeed, our capacity for language) are a consequence of our evolved capacity for meta-thought.
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12172
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Objects of amusement do not have to be real
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Full Idea:
It is a matter of indifference whether the object of amusement be thought to be real.
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From:
Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §7)
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A reaction:
Sort of. If I say 'wouldn't it be funny if someone did x?', it is probably much less funny than if I say 'apparently he really did x'. The fantasy case has to be much funnier to evoke the laughter.
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
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12174
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Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern
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Full Idea:
It is only rational beings who can be attentive without a motive; only rational beings who can be interested in that in which they have no interest.
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From:
Roger Scruton (Laughter [1982], §12)
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A reaction:
Rational beings make long term plans, so they cannot prejudge which things may turn out to be of interest to them. Scruton (a Kantian) makes it sound a little loftier than it actually is.
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