Ideas from 'Abstract Entities' by Chris Swoyer [2008], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics' (ed/tr Sider/Hawthorne/Zimmerman) [Blackwell 2008,978-1-4051-1229-1]].
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
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Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space)
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Full Idea:
Many things that seem to be abstract also seem to have a beginning (and ending) in time, such as a language like Urdu. It may be tempting to say that such things exist in time but not in space, but where exactly?
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From:
Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 1.1)
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A reaction:
A few distinctions might be needed. Urdu-speaking is an ability of certain people. We abstract from that their 'language'. There is nothing there apart from that ability. It has no more abstract existence than the 'weather'.
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
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Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing
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Full Idea:
Four things philosophers often want to know about a given sort of entity are: its existence conditions, its identity conditions, its modal status, and its epistemic status.
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From:
Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3)
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A reaction:
I prefer 'modal profile' to 'modal status'. The 'existence conditions' sound rather epistemic. Why does the existence of anything require 'conditions' other than just existing? I suspect identity is irrelevant if humans aren't around.
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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Can properties exemplify other properties?
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Full Idea:
Can properties themselves exemplify properties?
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From:
Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 3)
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A reaction:
Since I espouse a rather strict causal view of true properties, and lump the rest into the category of 'predicates', I am inclined to answer 'no' to this. Most people would disagree. 'Bright red' seems to be an example. But it isn't.
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
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Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things
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Full Idea:
Quantum field theory strongly suggests that there are (at the fundamental level) no individual, particular things.
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From:
Chris Swoyer (Abstract Entities [2008], 2.1)
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A reaction:
When people introduce quantum theory into ontological discussions I reach for my shotgun, but it does rather look as if things turn to mush at the bottom level.
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