Ideas from 'Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature?' by Bert Leuridan [2010], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophy of Science' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
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Generalisations must be invariant to explain anything
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
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Biological functions are explained by disposition, or by causal role
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
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Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities
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Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities
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We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms
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Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
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There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
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Rather than dispositions, functions may be the element that brought a thing into existence
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
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Pragmatic laws allow prediction and explanation, to the extent that reality is stable
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
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Strict regularities are rarely discovered in life sciences
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
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A 'law of nature' is just a regularity, not some entity that causes the regularity
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