Ideas from 'Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic' by Bertrand Russell [1911], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Essays in Analysis' by Russell,Bertrand (ed/tr Lackey,Douglas) [George Braziller 1973,0-8076-0699-5]].

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5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic

22329

Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality

			Full Idea: In 1911 Russell held that the propositions of logic are supremely general truths about the most pervasive traits of reality, to which we have access by abstraction from non-logical propositions.
			From: report of Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.4
			A reaction: Glock says the rival views were Mill's inductions, psychologism, and Frege's platonism. Wittgenstein converted Russell to a fifth view, that logic is empty tautologies. I remain resolutely attached to Russell's abstraction view.

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind

21569

It is good to generalise truths as much as possible

			Full Idea: It is a good thing to generalise any truth as much as possible.
			From: Bertrand Russell (Philosophical Implications of Mathematical logic [1911], p.289)
			A reaction: An interesting claim, which seems to have a similar status to Ockham's Razor. Its best justification is pragmatic, and concerns strategies for coping with a big messy world. Russell's defence is in 'as much as possible'.