Ideas from 'In Defense of Absolute Essentialism' by Graeme Forbes [1986], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Midwest Studs XI:Essentialism' (ed/tr French,Uehling,Wettstein) [Minnesota 1986,0-8166-1552-7]].
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
13804
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A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property
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13805
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Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13808
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A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
13806
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Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
13807
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A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
13809
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One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
13810
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The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing
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