Ideas from 'A Defense of Presentism' by Ned Markosian [2004], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Persistence: contemporary readings' (ed/tr Haslanger,S/|Kurtz,RM) [MIT 2006,978-0-58268-1]].
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14001
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People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
13991
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Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14002
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Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
14000
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'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
13990
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Presentism is the view that only present objects exist
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13992
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Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them
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13994
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Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times
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13995
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Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this
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13996
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Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears
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13997
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Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past
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13993
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Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
13998
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Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects
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13999
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People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something
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