Ideas from 'In Defense of Essentialism' by L.A. Paul [2006], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Metaphysics (Philosophical Perspectives 20)' (ed/tr Hawthorne,John) [Blackwell 2006,978-1-4051-6792-5]].
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal
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14195
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If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort
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Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
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Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
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Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
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Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
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Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality
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An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
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'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds
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