Ideas from 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' by Laura Schroeter [2010], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].
green numbers give full details |
back to texts
|
expand these ideas
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14703
|
Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual
|
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
14714
|
Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent
|
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
14704
|
2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
14706
|
Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
14711
|
Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state
|
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
14717
|
Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
14720
|
Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
14695
|
Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14697
|
'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension
|
14696
|
Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
14698
|
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world
|
14699
|
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings
|
14709
|
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims
|
14719
|
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True)
|
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
14701
|
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical
|
14702
|
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this
|
14705
|
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori?
|
14715
|
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference
|
14716
|
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved
|