Ideas from 'Substance' by David Robb [2009], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics' (ed/tr Le Poidevin/Simons etc) [Routledge 2012,978-0-415-49396-3]].
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
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A substance is, roughly, a basic being or subject at the foundation of reality
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Full Idea:
A substance is a basic being, something at reality's foundation. What exactly this means is a matter of some controversy. Some philosophers think of substance as an ultimate subject, something that has properties but isn't a property.
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From:
David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Intro')
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A reaction:
This seems to capture the place of 'substance' in contemporary metaphysics. I think of 'substance' as a placeholder for some threatened account, even in Aristotle.
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts
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Full Idea:
Sometimes a whole can survive a loss of parts: the chair would still exist if it lost one of its legs. This seems to give complex objects a sort of autonomy over their parts.
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From:
David Robb (Substance [2009], 'Ident')
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A reaction:
There is then a puzzle as to how much loss of parts the whole can survive, and why. The loss of a major part could be devastating, so why do all wholes not exhibit this relation to all their parts? I demand rules, now!
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