Ideas from 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' by Alan Sidelle [1989], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' by Sidelle,Alan [Cornell 1989,0-8014-2166-7]].
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
15169
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Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it)
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
15164
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We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15180
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There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184
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Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172
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Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181
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Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173
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That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
15185
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We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15175
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Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15032
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Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sider]
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15179
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To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
15171
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The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15167
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Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths
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15177
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Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15176
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The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15174
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A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference
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15183
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'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
15165
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A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
15168
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That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water'
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
15166
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Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open
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19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
15182
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Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
15178
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Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers?
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