Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance' by David Wiggins [1980], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Sameness and Substance' by Wiggins,David [Blackwell 1980,0-631-12846-8]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis

16512

Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts

17529

Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting

17530

The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism

16523

Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts

16524

Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

16526

Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed….

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation

16492

Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out

16493

Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location

16496

Singling out extends back and forward in time

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind

16495

The only singling out is singling out 'as' something

16501

In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is

16506

Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

16509

Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts

16514

Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

16510

Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time

16503

'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects

16499

A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork'

16515

A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus

16517

Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity

16502

Identity is primitive

16498

Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities

16497

Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

16521

A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects

16505

By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself!

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness

16494

We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible

16522

It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism

16525

Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts

16518

We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts

16511

A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')