Ideas from 'The Universe as We Find It' by John Heil [2012], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Universe as We Find It' by Heil,John [OUP 2012,978-0-19-959620-1]].
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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
18495
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The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
18494
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Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
18506
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Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
18535
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Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
18534
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Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18531
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Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18509
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Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
18518
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Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
18500
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How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
18539
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Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
18505
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Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
18499
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Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18512
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Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
18508
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Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18532
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If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
18510
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We need properties to explain how the world works
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
18522
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Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
18513
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Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18540
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Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
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18533
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In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
18511
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Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18523
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Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
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18524
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Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
18498
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Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
18507
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Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18515
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Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
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18516
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A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
18514
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Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
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18517
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Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
18502
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If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
18496
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If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
18525
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Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18504
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Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
18503
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You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
18537
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Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
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18538
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Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
18536
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The subject-predicate form reflects reality
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18497
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Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
18519
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If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
18526
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We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
18527
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Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
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27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
18520
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Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
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27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 9. Fine-Tuned Universe
18501
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Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
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