Ideas from 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?' by E.J. Lowe [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence

16548

An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right

16539

A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle

16540

Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition

16549

Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

16545

The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct

16546

The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

16551

Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

16542

Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

16552

If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity

16533

Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

16531

'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility

16532

'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty'

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence

16543

If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary

16544

Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds

16538

We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition

16534

'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

16535

A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference

16550

Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

16547

H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine