Ideas from 'Individuals without Sortals' by M.R. Ayers [1974], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
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17518
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Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
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17516
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If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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17520
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Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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17519
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To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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17511
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Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
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17510
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Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
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17522
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We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
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17515
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Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
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17517
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Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
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17513
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If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
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17523
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Sortals basically apply to individuals
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
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17514
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Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
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17521
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You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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17509
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Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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17512
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If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
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