Ideas from 'After Finitude; the necessity of contingency' by Quentin Meillassoux [2006], by Theme Structure
		
		[found in 'After Finitude: the necessity of contingency' by Meillassoux (ed/tr Brassier,R)  [Bloomsbury 2008,978-1-4411-7383-6]].
		
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		1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
		
	
	
		| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being | 
		
		
		
		
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
		
		
		
		
	           
	
	
		| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			       
	
	
		| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind | 
		
			
				 
				
      		
			
		
			
			
			
				
					28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
	            
            	       
	
	
		| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) |