Ideas from 'Truthmaking for Presentists' by Ross P. Cameron [2011], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.6' (ed/tr Zimmerman,D/Bennett,K) [OUP 2011,978-0-19-960304-6]].
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
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If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
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Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
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The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
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The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature
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One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths
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We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist!
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
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Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange'
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
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Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended?
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