Ideas from 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction' by Georges Rey [2013], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy' (ed/tr Stanford University) [plato.stanford.edu ,-]].
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
20298
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The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
20300
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Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
20294
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'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity
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20293
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Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed
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20297
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Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable
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20301
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The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used
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20302
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An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical)
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20303
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Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity
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19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
20299
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If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?
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