Ideas from 'On What There Is' by Willard Quine [1948], by Theme Structure
[found in 'From a Logical Point of View' by Quine,Willard [Harper and Row 1963,0-06-130566-9]].
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
1618
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We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
8455
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Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Orenstein]
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8456
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Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Orenstein]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
1611
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Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1613
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Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
1616
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Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
1615
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Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
1614
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Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
10241
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For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Shapiro]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
4064
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The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Crane]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19277
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Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Hale]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
12210
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Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8496
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What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
1610
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To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
8459
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Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Orenstein]
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8497
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An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
16261
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If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin]
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7698
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If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette]
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
1612
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Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15402
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There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4443
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Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Armstrong]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8498
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Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
8856
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Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Yablo]
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12443
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Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
18209
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We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
1619
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There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett]
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1617
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The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy
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1609
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I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
19159
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Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Davidson]
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