Ideas from 'On What There Is' by Willard Quine [1948], by Theme Structure

[found in 'From a Logical Point of View' by Quine,Willard [Harper and Row 1963,0-06-130566-9]].

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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic

1618	We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated

8455	Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Orenstein]

8456	Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Orenstein]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

1611	Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique

1613	Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism

1616	Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism

1615	Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism

1614	Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence

10241

For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Shapiro]

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being

4064	The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Crane]

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence

19277

Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Hale]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies

12210

Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

8496	What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers

1610	To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories

8459	Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Orenstein]

8497	An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems

16261

If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin]

7698	If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette]

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

1612	Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals

15402

There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism

4443	Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Armstrong]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

8498	Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary

8856	Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Yablo]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity

12443

Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles?

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

18209

We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

1619	There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings

1617	The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy

1609	I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have'

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

19159

Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Davidson]