Ideas from 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' by Willard Quine [1953], by Theme Structure

[found in 'From a Logical Point of View' by Quine,Willard [Harper and Row 1963,0-06-130566-9]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Shoemaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian]
Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich]
Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Horwich]
Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Jenkins]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'?
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A]