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19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics |
Full Idea: A 'nominal' definition is nothing more than an enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characteristics. | |||
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.284) | |||
A reaction: Not wholly clear. Are these actual distinguishing characteristics, or potential ones? Could DNA be part of a human's nominal definition (for an unidentified corpse, perhaps). |
19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive |
Full Idea: Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear ideas are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive. | |||
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |||
A reaction: This is Leibniz's expansion of Descartes's idea that knowledge rests on 'clear and distinct conceptions'. The ultimate target seems to be close to an Aristotelian 'real definition', which is comprehensive and precise. Does 'intuitive' mean coherent? |
19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions |
Full Idea: An idea is true if what it represents is possible; false if the representation contains a contradiction. | |||
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.287) | |||
A reaction: Odd in the analytic tradition to talk of a single idea or concept (rather than a proposition or utterance) as being 'true'. But there is clearly a notion of valid or legitimate or useful concepts here. Hilbert said true just meant non-contradictory. |
19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way |
Full Idea: In the schools the four causes are lumped together as material, formal, efficient, and final causes, but they have no clear definitions, and I would call such a judgment 'obscure'. | |||
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas [1684], p.283) | |||
A reaction: He picks this to illustrate what he means by 'obscure', so he must feel strongly about it. Elsewhere Leibniz embraces efficient and final causes, but says little of the other two. This immediately become clearer as the Four Modes of Explanation. |