Ideas from 'Mind in a Physical World' by Jaegwon Kim [1998], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind in the Physical World' by Kim,Jaegwon [MIT 2000,0-262-61153-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems

2319	Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction

2317	Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [PG]

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience

2310	Supervenience is linked to dependence

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience

2315	Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

2329	Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties

2320	Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents

13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism

530	There are two contradictory arguments about everything

13314

Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Seneca]

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique

2065	Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato]

1550	Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato]

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

2318	Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [PG]

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories

2325	It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

2324	Intentionality as function seems possible

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique

2314	Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism

2313	Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property

2328	The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind

2309	Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience

2311	Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique

2308	Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

2322	Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument

2327	Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions

2323	Emotions have both intentionality and qualia