Ideas from 'Mind in a Physical World' by Jaegwon Kim [1998], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mind in the Physical World' by Kim,Jaegwon [MIT 2000,0-262-61153-8]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
2319
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Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
2317
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Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [PG]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
2310
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Supervenience is linked to dependence
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
2315
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Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
2329
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Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
2320
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Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
530
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There are two contradictory arguments about everything
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13314
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Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Seneca]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
2065
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Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato]
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1550
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Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
2318
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Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [PG]
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2325
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It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2324
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Intentionality as function seems possible
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
2314
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Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
2313
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Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property
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2328
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The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
2311
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Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction
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2309
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Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
2308
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Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2322
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Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
2327
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Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
2323
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Emotions have both intentionality and qualia
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