Ideas from 'The Nature of Mental States' by Hilary Putnam [1968], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Mind Language and Reality: Papers vol 2' by Putnam,Hilary [CUP 1975,0-521-10668-5]].
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expand these ideas
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590
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Dispositions need mental terms to define them
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591
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Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588
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Is pain a functional state of a complete organism?
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2589
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Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions
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2592
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Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587
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Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376
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Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger]
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2330
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If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Kim]
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