Ideas from 'Troubles with Functionalism' by Ned Block [1978], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Philosophy of Mind' (ed/tr Beakley,B /Ludlow P) [MIT 1992,0-262-52167-9]].
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584
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Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582
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A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574
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Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2575
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Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries
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2583
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You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs
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2576
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In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578
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Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
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2585
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Not just any old functional network will have mental states
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2586
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In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579
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Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577
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Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine
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2580
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A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581
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Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not
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