Ideas from 'Universal Prescriptivism' by Richard M. Hare [1991], by Theme Structure

[found in 'A Companion to Ethics' (ed/tr Singer,Peter) [Blackwell 1993,0-631-18785-5]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

2705	How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?

2712	You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

2706	Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2708	An 'ought' statement implies universal application

2704	If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism

2703	Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation

2707	If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved

2709	Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable

2711	Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability

2710	Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle