Ideas from 'Bayesianism' by Paul Horwich [1992], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' by Dancy,Jonathan [Blackwell 1985,0-631-13622-3]].
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14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
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Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
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Full Idea:
Bayesianism says ideally rational people should have degrees of belief (not all-or-nothing beliefs), corresponding with probability theory. Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) X prob(E given H) / prob(E).
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From:
Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.41)
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Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
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Full Idea:
Bayesianism can explain the fact that in science surprising predictions have greater evidential value, as the equation produces a higher degree of confirmation.
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From:
Paul Horwich (Bayesianism [1992], p.42)
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