Ideas from 'works' by Willard Quine [1961], by Theme Structure

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics

13736

Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory

3302	Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Benardete,JA]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L

10211

Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Shapiro]

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory

3336	Two things can never entail three things [Benardete,JA]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

8453	If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification

10311

No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Hale]

10538

Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Dummett]

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

10793

Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Marcus (Barcan)]

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism

8466	For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Orenstein]

8467	Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Orenstein]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

10667

A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Hossack]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates

16021

Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Noonan]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories

3325	For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Benardete,JA]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

8534	Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Armstrong]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties

10295

Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Shapiro]

3322	Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Benardete,JA]

6078	Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [McGinn]

8479	Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Orenstein]

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

3751	Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Jacquette]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

7970	Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Macdonald,C]

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects

15783

Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan]

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

15782

Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Lycan]

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary

2796	For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Dancy,J]

12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism

8450	Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Orenstein]

13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism

3868	To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Newton-Smith]

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism

4713	For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [O'Grady]

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories

4712	Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [O'Grady]

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

7330	The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Miller,A]

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

17862

Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Almog]