Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by Jaegwon Kim [1996], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Kim,Jaegwon [Westview 1998,0-8133-0776-7]].
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
3426
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If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
3431
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Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
3437
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'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
3430
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Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
3432
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Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
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3434
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Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
3436
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Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
3406
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Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [PG]
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
3368
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Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
3392
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Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
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3396
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Experiment requires mental causation
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3397
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Beliefs cause other beliefs
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3367
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Both thought and language have intentionality
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3365
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Intentionality involves both reference and content
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
3360
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Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3366
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Pain has no reference or content
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
3389
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Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
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3391
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Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [PG]
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
3422
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Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3363
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We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
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3412
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How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3409
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Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3399
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If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3390
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Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
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3414
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What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3359
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Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
3369
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Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
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3428
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Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3380
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Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3370
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What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
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3373
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Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
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3371
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Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
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3372
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Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
3379
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Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
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3388
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Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
3384
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The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3393
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How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3439
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Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
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3427
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Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3424
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Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
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3376
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We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3362
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Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
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3413
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Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3374
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Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3433
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The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3377
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Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
3438
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Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
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3440
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Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
3375
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If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
3411
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How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3410
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Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
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3387
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A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
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3386
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Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
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3394
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Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
3382
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A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
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3383
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The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3408
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Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
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3420
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Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3418
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'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
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3421
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Content is best thought of as truth conditions
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3416
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Content may match several things in the environment
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3419
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Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
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3417
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Content depends on other content as well as the facts
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3403
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We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
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3402
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If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3401
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A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
3407
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Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause
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