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Ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind' by Jaegwon Kim [1996], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Philosophy of Mind' by Kim,Jaegwon [Westview 1998,0-8133-0776-7]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
3426 If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
3431 Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
3437 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
3432 Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property?
3434 Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
3436 Should properties be individuated by their causal powers?
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
3368 Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect?
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
3392 Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers
3396 Experiment requires mental causation
3397 Beliefs cause other beliefs
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
3367 Both thought and language have intentionality
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3365 Intentionality involves both reference and content
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
3360 Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
3366 Pain has no reference or content
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 6. Inverted Qualia
3389 Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional
3391 Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [PG]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3363 We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing
3412 How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3409 Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3399 If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3390 Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas?
3414 What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
3359 Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
3369 Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural
3428 Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
3380 Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation?
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
3370 What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs?
3371 Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together
3372 Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states
3373 Snakes have different pain behaviour from us
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
3384 The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
3393 How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3439 Reductionism gets stuck with qualia
3427 Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
3362 Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible
3413 Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
3374 Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
3438 Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level
3440 Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
3375 If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
3411 How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3387 A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling
3386 Folk psychology has been remarkably durable
3410 Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism
3394 Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
3382 A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test
3383 The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3408 Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds
3420 Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
3416 Content may match several things in the environment
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3417 Content depends on other content as well as the facts
3419 Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
3403 We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs
3402 If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
3401 A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
3407 Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause