Ideas from 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' by E.J. Lowe [1998], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' by Lowe,E.J. [OUP 2001,0-19-924499-5]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
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9414
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Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Mumford]
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16414
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Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Hofweber]
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
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8282
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Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change
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16127
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Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is
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2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
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8262
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How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
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8315
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Maybe facts are just true propositions
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
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8319
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One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
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8309
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A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
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8322
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I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions
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5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
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8312
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It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
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8297
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Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality
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6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
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8266
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Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous
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8302
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Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
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8298
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Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa
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8311
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If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
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8310
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Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do?
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
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8321
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All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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8300
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Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void)
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
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8281
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Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
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8270
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Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
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8308
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Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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8314
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Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents?
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8316
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Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations
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8318
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The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
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8323
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It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
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8313
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Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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8258
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Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
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8283
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Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
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8284
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The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent
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13122
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Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Westerhoff]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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8273
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Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental?
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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8285
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I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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8286
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Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
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8294
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How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
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8295
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Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
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8296
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Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
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8288
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Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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8293
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Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
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8307
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Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
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8267
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Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
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8265
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Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
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8275
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Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
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16130
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To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
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8263
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An object is an entity which has identity-conditions
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
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8268
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Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
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8303
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Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
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8292
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Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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8291
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Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
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16128
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A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
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8279
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The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin?
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
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8271
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An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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8272
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How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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8305
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A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
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8290
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One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
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15079
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'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
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16063
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Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lynch/Glasgow]
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
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8260
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Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds)
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
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16131
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The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
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8320
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Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
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8280
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While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
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8276
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Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
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8289
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The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
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8299
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Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
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8306
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You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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8317
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To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
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8269
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Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them
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