Ideas from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' by E.J. Lowe [2000], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' by Lowe,E.J. [CUP 2000,0-521-65428-9]].
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
6653
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Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
6618
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A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
6635
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Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
6619
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Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
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11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
6643
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'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
6638
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One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
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6644
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Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
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6647
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Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6639
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The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
6640
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A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
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6645
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If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
6637
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How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
6667
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There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
6642
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Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
6641
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Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
6617
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The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
6626
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'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
6646
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The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
6665
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Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
6670
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If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
6671
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It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
6666
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All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
6625
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If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
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17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
6621
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You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
6654
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A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
6634
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Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
6648
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Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
6652
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'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
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6651
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People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
6655
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The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
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6657
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Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
6656
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The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
6633
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Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6631
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If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
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20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
6659
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The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
6661
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Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
6662
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We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
6663
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People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
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