Ideas from 'Rationality in Action' by John Searle [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Rationality in Action' by Searle,John R. [MIT 2001,0-262-19463-5]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
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3811
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Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
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3822
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Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
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3812
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Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
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3806
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Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
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5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
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3809
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If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
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3810
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In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
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3841
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
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3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
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3816
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Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
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3828
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Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
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3823
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Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
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3821
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Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
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3824
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A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
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3834
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An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
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3825
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Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
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3826
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A self must at least be capable of consciousness
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3829
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Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
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3827
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The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
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3820
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The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
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3808
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Rational decision making presupposes free will
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3817
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Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
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3818
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We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
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3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
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3840
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We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
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3815
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The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
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3839
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Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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3835
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If it is true, you ought to believe it
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3836
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If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
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3838
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Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
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3813
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'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
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