Ideas from 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge' by Laurence Bonjour [1980], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism' (ed/tr Kornblith,Hilary) [Blackwell 2001,0-631-22106-9]].
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5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / e. The Lottery paradox
4261
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The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [PG]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
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Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
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The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
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Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
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External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
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Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria
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