Ideas from 'Causation and Explanation' by Stathis Psillos [2002], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Causation and Explanation' by Psillos,Stathis [Acumen 2002,1-902683-42-0]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
4767
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Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons
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5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
4810
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Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist
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14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
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If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction
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4807
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A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
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Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
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Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
4802
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Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law
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4804
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The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events
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4805
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If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
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There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations
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4806
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An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
4404
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Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner
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4803
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An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
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It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
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Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence
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4400
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Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties
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4403
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We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
4789
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Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
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If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
4402
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Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
4774
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Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
4793
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"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
4397
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Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation
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4401
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It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity
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4792
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A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts
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4801
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The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
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Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
4799
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Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4780
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In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent
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4791
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Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur
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