Ideas from 'Universals' by J.P. Moreland [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Universals' by Moreland,J.P. [Acumen 2001,1-902683-23-4]].
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4456
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Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
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Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
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Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
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A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex
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4463
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In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4451
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If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties?
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4453
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One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem
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4464
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Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
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The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes
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4449
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Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
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The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4452
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Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties
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4467
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A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary
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4469
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There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself
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4468
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How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space?
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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
4472
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Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4459
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Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
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There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate
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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
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We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
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Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
4460
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Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
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It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
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'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists
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