Ideas from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory' by Thomas Reid [1785], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Inquiry and Essays' by Reid,Thomas (ed/tr Beanblossom /K.Lehrer) [Hackett 1983,0-915145-85-5]].
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
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1350
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Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
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21322
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We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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21320
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Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
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1367
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Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
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23644
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Without memory we could have no concept of duration
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23643
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We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings)
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15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
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1356
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A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
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1359
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Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility
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16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
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21319
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I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
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21323
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The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
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21321
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Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses
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21325
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Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!
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21324
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If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20
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21327
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If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
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1366
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If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
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1352
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Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't
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