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| 24008 | Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions |
| Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts. | |||
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223) | |||
| A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots. |
| 24009 | Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things |
| Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice). | |||
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225) | |||
| A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic. |
| 24007 | Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions |
| Full Idea: Emotivism held that there were two purposes of moral judgements: to express the emotions of the speaker, and to influence the emotions of his hearers. | |||
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.209) | |||
| A reaction: I take Ayer to be typical of the first project, and Hare of the second. The theory is much more plausible when the second aim is added. Would we ever utter a moral opinion if we didn't hope to influence someone? |
| 24010 | An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses |
| Full Idea: One's conception of an admirable human being implies that he should be disposed to certain kinds of emotional response, and not to others. | |||
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225) | |||
| A reaction: So are the good emotions an indicator of being a good person, or is that what their goodness consists of? The goodness must be cashed out in actions, and presumably good emotions both promise good actions, and motivate them. |
| 24012 | Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness |
| Full Idea: There is a certain moral woodenness or even insolence in Kant's blank regard for consistency. It smacks of Keynes's Principle of Unfairness - that if you can't do a good turn to everybody, you shouldn't do it to anybody. | |||
| From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.226) | |||
| A reaction: He says it also turns each of us into a Supreme Legislator, which deifies man. It is clearly not the case that morality consists entirely of rules and principles, but Williams recognises their role, in truth-telling for example. |