Ideas from 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person' by Harry G. Frankfurt [1971], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Free Will' (ed/tr Watson,Gary) [OUP 1982,0-19-87054-4]].
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
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Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires
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A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
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Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
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The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
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Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Wilson/Schpall]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions
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A person may be morally responsible without free will
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