Ideas from 'Physics' by Aristotle [337 BCE], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Physics' by Aristotle (ed/tr Waterfield,Robin) [OUP 1996,0-19-282310-8]].
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
5082
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Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars
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4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
13270
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Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause?
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9790
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Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
22962
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Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
18090
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Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
22929
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Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Le Poidevin]
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
22930
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Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Le Poidevin]
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18833
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A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9974
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Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
5105
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The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
22960
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The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace
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16115
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Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17262
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Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Correia/Schnieder]
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8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16656
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The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16644
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The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
5117
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Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17041
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Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16172
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Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it
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16623
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We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
16174
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A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17043
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Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
16970
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A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16104
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Unity of the form is just unity of the definition
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
11255
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In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Politis]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
16791
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There is no whole except for the parts
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9071
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We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
16972
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The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Moravcsik]
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5084
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A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
16173
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Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
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17042
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Natural things are their own source of stability through change
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16691
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A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
16574
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Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
11254
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Matter is potentiality [Politis]
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
13106
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Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings
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13108
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Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice
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13110
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Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary
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13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8331
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To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
5080
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We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
16969
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Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
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11250
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Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Politis]
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12045
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Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Annas]
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16968
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There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13109
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Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9789
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You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9788
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Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
5107
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Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20042
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We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
5110
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Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
5111
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All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
5092
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Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first
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5113
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Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order
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5085
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'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
5089
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Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains?
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
5086
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The nature of a thing is its end and purpose
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5087
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A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends
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5091
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Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
5108
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Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise?
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
5095
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The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end
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5093
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Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
16762
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Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
17464
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When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
11252
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The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Politis]
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11253
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A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Politis]
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13107
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Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
8332
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The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
9787
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Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study
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27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
20063
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Motion fulfils potentiality
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5114
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If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe?
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5116
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When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
5097
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If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place
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5099
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The universe as a whole is not anywhere
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
5098
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Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
20920
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If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
22967
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It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul
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5106
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Would there be time if there were no mind?
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
5104
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Time is an aspect of change
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22885
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For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Bardon]
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8590
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Time does not exist without change
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22959
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Time is not change, but the number we associate with change
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22964
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Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure
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22965
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Time measures rest, as well as change
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22956
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How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be?
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5102
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If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
5103
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Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
22961
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The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
22916
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Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Le Poidevin]
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
16693
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Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows
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22958
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Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
22968
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Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere
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22963
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We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined
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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22966
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The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future)
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22957
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We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things
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27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
5083
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Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical.
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28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
5119
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The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude
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