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Ideas from 'Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals' by Immanuel Kant [1785], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Moral Law (Groundwork of Morals)' by Kant,Immanuel (ed/tr Paton,H.J.) [Hutchinson 1948,0-09-036033-8]].

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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
3722 Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
3738 The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3726 The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3739 Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
3741 We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3740 We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
5296 Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Marx/Engels]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
24011 Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
5074 Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R]
8024 The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22390 Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
9750 We must only value what others find acceptable [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20160 Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
9749 Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Korsgaard]
7671 Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Berlin]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3720 We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
3717 Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
3712 A good will is not good because of what it achieves
3725 The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
3733 The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
3736 Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
3544 Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Annas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
7674 Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Berlin]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
21029 Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3715 Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
4024 Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C]
7105 If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Statman]
3710 The only purely good thing is a good will
7625 We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam]
20715 It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
3737 The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3724 A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
3735 Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
3723 There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
5295 Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Marx/Engels]
3714 Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
3718 Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
6695 Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Graham]
8028 Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
8026 Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
15673 The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Finlayson]
8068 Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe]
22009 Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends
4413 The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche]
3727 Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
8025 The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre]
8027 I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre]
3728 Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [PG]
22008 Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means
3719 If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
3716 Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
3762 Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
22050 The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Bowie]
3731 Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
6694 Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
4345 For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Hursthouse]
3711 Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
4251 If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B]
16004 If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard]
4344 Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
3713 The function of reason is to produce a good will
3729 Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
3732 Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
7670 Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Berlin]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
7591 Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
7673 Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Berlin]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
3730 Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3721 We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
8046 We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / c. Moral Argument
20714 God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Davies,B]