Ideas from 'Enquiry Conc Human Understanding' by David Hume [1748], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Enquiries Conc. Human Understanding, Morals' by Hume,David (ed/tr Selby-Bigge/Nidditch) [OUP 1975,0-19-824536-x]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
2196
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The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
2187
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If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from
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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
2200
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All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
4636
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All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes)
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
2197
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Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
7700
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We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles
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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
13602
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We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
2216
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We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions
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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
2215
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There is no such thing as chance
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2209
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Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
2207
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Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions
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2208
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Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
3661
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'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Strawson,G]
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2213
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Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
2191
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Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
2239
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If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
2237
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It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
2190
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All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact
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2192
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All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses
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23631
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Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid]
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2184
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All ideas are copies of impressions
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2182
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Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones
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2246
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If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
2189
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All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
2194
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How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire?
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2183
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We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences
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2702
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Only madmen dispute the authority of experience
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2205
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You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience
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2217
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When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise
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2186
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We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced
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12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
3902
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Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton]
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23421
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If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
2206
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Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
2235
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There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
10328
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We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection
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2230
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Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [PG]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
2238
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Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects
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2242
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Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
2243
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Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
2236
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Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2241
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The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it
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2240
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It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument
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14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
2198
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We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread
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14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
2199
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Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places
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2202
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Fools, children and animals all learn from experience
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2204
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All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning
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2201
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Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this
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2203
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If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6350
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Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz]
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3598
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Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
17712
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General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular
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2210
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A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance
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8544
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Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker]
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 8. Remembering Contiguity
2211
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When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly
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15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
2212
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An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him
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2214
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Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
2222
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The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
2223
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Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains
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3655
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Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted]
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20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
2220
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Only experience teaches us about our wills
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
2224
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Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
2225
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If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime
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2226
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Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind
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25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
2233
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No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
2195
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We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
4772
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If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved
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2245
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A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
8341
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Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Strawson,G]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8344
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At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Davidson]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
2193
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No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions
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4771
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In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos]
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5194
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Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer]
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2221
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A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience
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2234
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It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other
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3662
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Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Strawson,G]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8422
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Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
2218
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In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities
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15249
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Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden]
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8339
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Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Strawson,G]
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
2244
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It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist
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28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
2232
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You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect
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28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
2228
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All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle'
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2229
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To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event
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2227
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A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored
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28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
2185
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The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds
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