Ideas from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' by Bertrand Russell [1918], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Russell's Logical Atomism' by Russell,Bertrand (ed/tr Pears,David) [Fontana 1972,-]].
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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
6095
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The business of metaphysics is to describe the world
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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
6106
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Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
6090
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Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences
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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18348
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Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Rami]
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4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
6103
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Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical
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5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6092
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In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object
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6101
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Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist'
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
6102
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You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to
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10423
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There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Sainsbury]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
7744
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Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [McCullogh]
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10426
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A name has got to name something or it is not a name
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
6104
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Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21708
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Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Linsky,B]
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19051
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Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Quine]
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6089
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Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis
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6100
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Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts
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6105
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Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
21709
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You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Armstrong]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
5465
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Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Ellis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
6060
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'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
6099
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Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
6098
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Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
6097
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The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent
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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
9022
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Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
6091
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Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
21702
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In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Quine]
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19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
6094
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An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions
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6096
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I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods
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21712
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I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6093
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The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
6119
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You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name
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