Ideas from 'Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey' by Roger Scruton [1994], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Modern Philosophy: introduction and survey' by Scruton,Roger [Sinclair-Stevenson 1994,1-85619-392-6]].
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
3879
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Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything
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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
3891
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If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p
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2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
3894
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We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
3883
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A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
3884
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The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth
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6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
3907
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Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects?
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6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
3908
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If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
3906
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If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
3888
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Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re
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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
3903
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The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable
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11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
3897
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Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge
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11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3881
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In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
3887
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Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
3901
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Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
3885
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We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities
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3910
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If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities?
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
3899
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The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3898
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My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3880
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Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
3878
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Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths?
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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
3892
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Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same
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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3911
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The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
3882
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Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private
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23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
3896
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Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3886
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Membership is the greatest source of obligation
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
3895
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The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
3890
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'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation
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27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
3904
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Measuring space requires no movement while I do it
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28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
3905
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'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance
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