Ideas from 'The View from Nowhere' by Thomas Nagel [1986], by Theme Structure
[found in 'The View from Nowhere' by Nagel,Thomas [OUP 1989,0-19-505644-2]].
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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
3240
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There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3242
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Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it
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1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
3241
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It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds
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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
20989
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Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species
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22354
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Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Reiss/Sprenger]
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3248
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Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective
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12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
3249
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Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
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22429
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We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities
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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
3247
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Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge
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13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3252
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Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible
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14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3251
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Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity
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16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3244
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Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori
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3245
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The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity
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16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
3246
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I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
3257
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Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
3265
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We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3263
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If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
3256
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Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
3261
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Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3258
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If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3264
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We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values
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3254
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If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory
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23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3255
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We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives
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23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3262
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Utilitarianism is too demanding
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