Ideas from 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Hilary Putnam [1978], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences' by Putnam,Hilary [RKP 1981,0-7100-0437-0]].
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6267
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A culture needs to admit that knowledge is more extensive than just 'science'
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6272
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'True' and 'refers' cannot be made scientically precise, but are fundamental to science
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
6266
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We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
6277
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Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible
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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
6269
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Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true'
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6264
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In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language
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6265
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Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
6280
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Realism is a theory, which explains the convergence of science and the success of language
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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
6284
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If a tautology is immune from revision, why would that make it true?
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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 7. Testimony
6273
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Knowledge depends on believing others, which must be innate, as inferences are not strong enough
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6274
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Empathy may not give knowledge, but it can give plausibility or right opinion
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
17084
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You can't decide which explanations are good if you don't attend to the interest-relative aspects
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6282
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Theory of meaning presupposes theory of understanding and reference
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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
6281
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Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation
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6278
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We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning
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19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
6271
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How reference is specified is not what reference is
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19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
6268
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The claim that scientific terms are incommensurable can be blocked if scientific terms are not descriptions
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19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
6279
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A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6270
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The correct translation is the one that explains the speaker's behaviour
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6283
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Language maps the world in many ways (because it maps onto other languages in many ways)
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6275
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You can't say 'most speaker's beliefs are true'; in some areas this is not so, and you can't count beliefs
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