Ideas from 'Against Liberalism' by John Kekes [1997], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Against Liberalism' by Kekes,John [Cornell 1997,0-8014-8400-6]].
green numbers give full details |
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12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
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23101
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Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations
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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
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23086
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Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions
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23100
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Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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23096
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Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones
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23098
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Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree
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23087
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Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous
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23089
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Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation
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23093
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Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct
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23094
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Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy
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23095
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Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience?
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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23090
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Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
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23117
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Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object
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23119
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Sentimental love distorts its object
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
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23088
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Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
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23097
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What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
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23099
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It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character
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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
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23118
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Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help
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24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
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23109
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The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations
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24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
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23114
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The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life
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24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
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23116
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Citizenship is easier than parenthood
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24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
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23103
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Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
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23107
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Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
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23081
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Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
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23085
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The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy
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23092
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Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
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23102
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Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
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23084
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Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality?
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24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
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23082
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Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors
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23079
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Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice
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23091
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Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic?
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23112
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Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil
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25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
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23106
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To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives
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23121
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It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others
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25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
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23105
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It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires
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23120
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The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality
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25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
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23108
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Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert
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25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
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23083
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Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert
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25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
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23113
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Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations
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