Ideas from 'Reason, Truth and History' by Hilary Putnam [1981], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Reason, Truth and History' by Putnam,Hilary [CUP 1998,0-521-29776-1]].
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1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
7623
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For ancient Greeks being wise was an ethical value
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3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [O'Grady]
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
7617
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Before Kant, all philosophers had a correspondence theory of truth
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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
4716
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The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [O'Grady]
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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
7616
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Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability
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5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
14203
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Intension is not meaning, as 'cube' and 'square-faced polyhedron' are intensionally the same
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5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
14207
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If cats equal cherries, model theory allows reinterpretation of the whole language preserving truth
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
14214
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If we try to cure the abundance of theories with causal links, this is 'just more theory' [Lewis]
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14205
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The sentence 'A cat is on a mat' remains always true when 'cat' means cherry and 'mat' means tree
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
7610
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A fact is simply what it is rational to accept
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7618
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Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them
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10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
4718
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If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [O'Grady]
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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
7620
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Some kind of objective 'rightness' is a presupposition of thought itself
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14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
14204
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Naïve operationalism would have meanings change every time the tests change
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
7611
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Rationality is one part of our conception of human flourishing
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
14200
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'Water' on Twin Earth doesn't refer to water, but no mental difference can account for this
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
7613
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Concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences
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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
14202
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Neither individual nor community mental states fix reference
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14201
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Maybe the total mental state of a language community fixes the reference of a term
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19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
14206
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There are infinitely many interpretations of a sentence which can all seem to be 'correct'
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
7624
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The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values
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