Ideas from 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by David Wiggins [2001], by Theme Structure
[found in 'Sameness and Substance Renewed' by Wiggins,David [CUP 2001,0-521-45619-3]].
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expand these ideas
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11832
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We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything
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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11863
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(λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'.
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
14746
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What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider]
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11900
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We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P]
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11870
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Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11866
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The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal
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9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
11896
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A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P]
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15835
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Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Mackie,P]
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11841
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The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star
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10679
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'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Hossack]
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14363
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Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Strawson,P]
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14364
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A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Strawson,P]
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11851
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Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals
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11865
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The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14744
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Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Sider]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
11852
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Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns?
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11875
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Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14749
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Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Sider]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
11844
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If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11861
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We can forget about individual or particularized essences
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11871
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Essences are not explanations, but individuations
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
11879
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Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Mackie,P]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
11835
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The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
11876
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It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
11858
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The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11843
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Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts
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11864
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Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
11831
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The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
14362
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Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Strawson,P]
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11838
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Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
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11847
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To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
11839
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Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law?
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11845
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Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
11869
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Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions
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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11850
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Not every story corresponds to a possible world
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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11848
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Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
11859
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The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
11836
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We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
11860
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Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds
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